tweetindex
PT

Giorgi Revishvili

@revishvilig · joined 23 Jul 2014

Military Analyst • Former Senior Advisor to NSC of Georgia • Focused on Russia-Ukraine war and Eurasian Security • Views my own •

41 853Followers
539Following
18 929Posts total
161.6KViews on collected posts

Posts recentes

General Biletskyi, Commander of Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps: As a result of search-and-strike operations by our units, Russian infiltration positions were eliminated in the areas of Novoselivka, Yarova, Korovyi Yar, and Oleksandrivka. 1/7 https://t.co/0vBEKfR3fH
2.4K views · 51 likes · 8 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
@revishvilig Ooo this h job Jol 18 views · 0 likes · 0 reposts · 0 replies Open on X →
—— Please remember to subscribe and support my Substack - Russia Analyzed - for the latest insights and analysis on Russian foreign and security policy and the war against Ukraine. https://t.co/oUxLSjBpaP https://t.co/ekqL8XXVPC
3K views · 17 likes · 2 reposts · 0 replies Open on X →
Read the full analysis here: https://t.co/lp1OdxmR5K https://t.co/I066xNtQFX
5.6K views · 59 likes · 4 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
The objective would be to create a buffer zone in Sumy and Chernihiv regions and continue terrorizing our capital. 13/13 5.7K views · 93 likes · 3 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
We also believe that the enemy could easily use part of the mobilized reserve it forms by the beginning of winter to pin down our forces and prevent us from redeploying reserves to the northern borders of our country. 12/13 5.7K views · 101 likes · 1 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
All of its columns were detected while still in their staging areas. Strikes were conducted along their routes of advance, reaching more than 40–50 kilometers into the depth of the enemy’s rear. 11/13 5.7K views · 102 likes · 0 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
The enemy will be forced to shift from the tactics of small infantry groups to using heavy armored vehicles and attempting mechanized breakthroughs deep into our defensive positions. This is essentially what it did last winter and autumn, but it had no chance of success. 10/13 6K views · 111 likes · 0 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
By October, we expect a change in tactics. We associate this with sharp changes in weather conditions. Heavy rains will begin, fog will set in, and daylight hours will become shorter. 9/13 6.3K views · 101 likes · 0 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
Russian losses are enormous. In July, it was 123 servicemen per day; in August, 135 servicemen per day. We expect September to be the culmination of the summer offensive campaign, because the enemy needs to demonstrate at least some kind of result. 8/13 6.9K views · 105 likes · 4 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
This would allow them to infiltrate and gain access to the operational space, enabling them to concentrate and increase their efforts there. We will not allow them to do this. They have no chance of succeeding. 7/13 7.3K views · 110 likes · 1 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
By the end of the autumn campaign, when the leaves fall, the enemy will attempt to establish a foothold in at least one of these settlements. The objective would be to create a bridgehead for further operations. 6/13 7.7K views · 106 likes · 1 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
As for the Donetsk urban agglomeration, which currently anchors the front line, imagine drawing a hypothetical line from Dobropillia through Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, and Sviatohirsk. 5/13 8.2K views · 103 likes · 2 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
Therefore, Russia needs mobilization. By the end of September and before the beginning of winter, the enemy could rapidly mobilize up to 600,000 servicemen and quickly train them. We could see them on the line of contact in the near future, by the end of this year. 4/13 8.4K views · 115 likes · 5 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
As of now, the enemy has failed to achieve its strategic objective of capturing Dobropillia by the end of summer. It has failed in its summer offensive campaign, achieving only limited tactical gains. 3/13 8.4K views · 132 likes · 3 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
Everyone knows perfectly well what Rubicon is. The enemy currently has around 100 crews, and one-third of the entire Rubicon force is deployed specifically in the Dobropillia direction. 2/13 8.7K views · 125 likes · 5 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
General Denys Prokopenko, Commander of Ukraine's 1st Corps Azov: The situation in the Dobropillia direction is quite difficult. The balance of forces is approximately 1 to 6, with Russia deploying greater numbers of personnel, military units, and overall capabilities. 1/13 https
49.3K views · 794 likes · 101 reposts · 2 replies Open on X →
I highly doubt Moscow will deliver on its promise, if it indeed made one to President Trump, because one of the pillars of Russia’s theory of victory this winter rests precisely on intensifying attacks against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure https://t.co/rXtpokxNc2
1.2K views · 30 likes · 8 reposts · 4 replies Open on X →
—— Please remember to subscribe and support my Substack - Russia Analyzed - for the latest insights and analysis on Russian foreign and security policy and the war against Ukraine. https://t.co/oUxLSjBpaP https://t.co/Ygg8LGWROY
533 views · 2 likes · 0 reposts · 0 replies Open on X →
Read the full text here: https://t.co/HA28APwN56 https://t.co/w696rcN94Q
881 views · 12 likes · 1 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
We need to work and prepare for air defense, but the main focus must remain on protecting our infantry and fighting on the ground. 9/9 863 views · 26 likes · 0 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
Our main task is to stop Russian troops on the ground, at the infantry level. Believe me, they will continue striking us until we stop the front line. The front line and the soldier remain the most important elements. 7/9 499 views · 27 likes · 0 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
We need to work with the manufacturers of these missiles. Air-to-air missiles—that is the direction we should pursue. Things are already changing, because by summer there will be 100% jet-powered drones. 6/9 508 views · 24 likes · 0 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
But while we are fighting at the front, this is the most important thing. As soon as the front stops moving, as soon as the Russians fail to achieve a single success—not even a single kilometer—believe me, then they will ask the question: “So what is this war for?” 8/9 749 views · 28 likes · 0 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
Because right now I hear a lot of people saying that we need to buy drones that will shoot down other drones. My opinion is no. We need to develop short-range missiles. 5/9 529 views · 26 likes · 1 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
We simply cannot train that many pilots for F-16s, let alone for this. So, in my personal opinion, the answer is missiles that can intercept these same jet-powered drones, but they need to operate at altitude. 4/9 549 views · 27 likes · 0 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
I believe only in missiles that will be able to intercept glide bombs and jet-powered drones. Because can you imagine what kind of drone pilot you would need at a speed of 500? 3/9 649 views · 28 likes · 0 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
A complete change every 2 to 3 months. As for air defense - this needs to be a joint effort with the West. And the sooner we work together to build a two- or three-tiered defensive line to protect the skies, the better. Air defense is the future of Western states. 2/9 741 views · 28 likes · 0 reposts · 1 replies Open on X →
Ihor Obolienskyi, Commander of Ukraine's Khartiia 2nd Corps: Technology is changing the battlefield incredibly quickly. Unbelievably quickly. What was happening two years ago is simply no longer comparable to what we have today. Technology is changing every 2-3 months. 1/9 https
5.2K views · 121 likes · 17 reposts · 2 replies Open on X →
Spoke with The Sun about CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s rare visit to Moscow, European security, and potential peace talks. Three key issues were likely discussed during the meetings: 1. Potential further Russian escalation against NATO 2. Ukraine, including possible Russian htt
14:08
3.2K views · 16 likes · 0 reposts · 0 replies Open on X →

Em comparação com contas do mesmo porte

30 posts dos últimos 90 dias, ao lado da faixa de 10K–100K seguidores. aparece para mais gente do que contas do mesmo porte.

Mediana de visualizações4 180esta conta1 011mediana para 10K–100K
Alcance, %9.99%esta conta3.74%mediana para 10K–100K
Engajamento, %1.74%esta conta1.65%mediana para 10K–100K
MétricaEsta contaMediana para 10K–100KProporção
Mediana de visualizações por post4 1801 0114.14×
Alcance (visualizações ÷ seguidores)9.99%3.74%2.67×
Taxa de engajamento1.74%1.65%1.05×

Outras contas desta faixa →   Comparar com outra conta →   Como estas referências são construídas →

Growth & engagement

How the posts we collected actually performed: views and reaction rate post by post, what the audience did with them, and where the follower count goes.

Views per post

8.4K14 Sep
8.2K
7.7K
7.3K
6.9K
6.3K
6K
5.7K
5.7K
5.7K
5.6K
3K
1815 Sep
2.4K

Last 14 collected posts, oldest on the left. The scale is logarithmic: one post can outrun the rest a hundred times over.

Engagement rate per post

1.44%14 Sep
1.29%
1.40%
1.52%
1.60%
1.61%
1.86%
1.80%
1.79%
1.69%
1.14%
0.63%
0.00%15 Sep
2.46%

Reactions — likes, reposts, replies and quotes — divided by views. Median for 10K–100K accounts is 1.65%.

What the audience does

Likes89.8%2 620 in total
Reposts5.7%167 in total
Replies1.1%31 in total
Bookmarks3.4%99 in total

Share of every reaction we collected for this account. Replies mean argument, reposts mean endorsement, bookmarks mean the post was worth keeping.

The follower curve appears once this account has two daily snapshots — we take one a day, and this one is on its first.

Contas semelhantes