Ibrahim Jalal | إبراهيم جلال ✓
@IbrahimJalalYE · Around · joined 22 Aug 2014
Senior Researcher & Policy Advisor Regional Security & Transnational Threats Risk & Resilience Yemen, Gulf & Horn of Africa
14 559Followers
493Following
15 636Posts total
1MViews on collected posts
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I flagged Bab al-Mandab as an IRGC priority 2 months ago
It fell to the Houthis a few days ago, not to combat power, but intelligence infiltration exploiting shattered C2
One fake withdrawal order did what the fighting couldn't. Most accounts miss that. Here is what happened👇
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ليست النهاية
اليمن وقضيته أكبر من معركة، وأسمى من خلافاتنا جميعاً. نعرف مرارة ما جرى في الساحل التهامي، وحجم الإحباط والغضب حين تُفقد أرض رُويت بدماء آلاف الأبطال من ربوع اليمن وأشقائهم. لكن أفدح الخسائر أن تتحول نكسة عسكرية إلى انكسار وطني، وأن نستبدل مراجعة الأخطاء بتبادل
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Contrary to circulating rumours of a Houthi withdrawal from Bab al-Mandab approcahes, air strikes continue to target Houthi positions & reinforcements across the theatre.
The expanded kill box aims at denying the militias time to fortify & attrit them. https://t.co/5OeM5heGdK
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2:16
Is Iran preparing for a two-strait war?
Hormuz is under pressure. Bab al-Mandab is held as a conditional second front, potentially linking the US–Iran confrontation with renewed Houthi cross-border escalation into a system-wide regional crisis👇
https://t.co/77QuipEV7Q https://
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@IbrahimJalalYE Thank you for the good thread, please do write an article on this, many people are looking at the Houthis for the first time and will find the context useful.
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@KatieZimmerman @WSJ 35] Such approach could be supported with informational warfare, proactive targeted sanctions further disrupting war-financing networks, sustained back-channel talks, and greater enforcement of arms embargo on and enhanced interdiction of illicit arms to the
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@KatieZimmerman @WSJ 34] A multi-dimensional strategy that factors in the root causes of Yemen’s ongoing war, rethinks its peace process & in the run up to peace addresses alarming power imbalances by reconsidering active military pressure is necessary to contain, if not defuse,
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@KatieZimmerman @WSJ 33] This effort shall proceed in tandem with strengthening defensive posture in the Red Sea to secure commercial vessels & candid conversations with regional actors on leading a home-grown regional security architecture rather than hoping they would support r
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@KatieZimmerman @WSJ 32] This includes a prioritisation of the security track and supporting the Yemeni government militarily, logistically, financially and intelligence-wise to address domestic power imbalance in Yemen by applying military measure around the Marib and Red Sea go
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@KatieZimmerman @WSJ 31] The alternative to short-term reactive policies is seizing the opportunity to rethink miscalculations, tactical engagement & mismanagement. The west must develop a long-term security strategy integral to the Yemen peace process & requirements of regional
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@KatieZimmerman @WSJ 30] What is the balance between short-term priorities and long-term strategic interests of securing the freedom of navigation, ensuring unhindered flow of goods via the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, and containing and reducing maligned Irania
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29] As @KatieZimmerman and Kenneth Pollack recently argued in a @WSJ piece, the growing number of attacks on shipping in the Red Sea demonstrate they are now a strategic threat to America, its allies and the global economy. We must address them as such.”
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28] Policy discussions prior to the strike were binary - strike or don’t - demonstrating a problematic disconnect between short-term objectives and long-term stability interests. The answers lies in rethinking what kind of Yemen is good for regional security, stability & peace.
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27] Western powers once thought the threat is not expandable; they could work with the growing strength of a hardeline Iran-backed regime that seized power in Sanaa, developed a repressive de facto police authority that does not deliver services & threatened neighbours. Surprise!
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26] Much of the attention on Yemen focused on quick fixes, the humanitarian crisis & “ending the conflict’ regardless of who emerged dominant & without a clear vision of the Yemen the world wants to see. This has all blown up at a globally disruptive level. It is a reality check!
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25] Overall, the west’s military resolve & strategic thinking are facing a credible test. If they continue to address the symptoms of Houthi attacks & view them as events rather than strategic developments that could reoccur, they are doomed to fail by choice for many years.
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24] Eighth, it is unclear whether the west is willing to rethink the fragile peace roadmap by incorporating a security track, with robust support for the Yemeni government to address power imbalances internally through active military pressure to protect maritime trade & security
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23] Seventh, there is a dire need to strengthen Yemeni Coast Guard capabilities, as well as those of Red Sea littoral states, including through provision of vessels, financing, training, information & technology to support home-grown security measures, a critical long-term angle.
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22] Sixth, Oman and Saudi Arabia are likely to play a facilitation role in back-channel talks to de-escalate the situation, passing messages back and fourth; however, these efforts are likely short-termed & tactical, requiring a broader multi-stakeholder international strategy.
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21] Fifth, the west and Red Sea littoral states are likely to deepen robust intelligence sharing mechanisms on maritime security, goods flowing into Yemen, Houthi capabilities and Iran’s support, which requires a recalibration in western strategy & trust rebuilding in the region.
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20] Fourth, shipping & energy companies will have to adopt high-risk mitigation strategies, incurring higher costs. If Houthi attacks continued, war premium insurance & the cost/time of shipping would likely remain high in the short-term, given use of the Cape of the Good Hope.
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19] Third, given that Yemen is under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the Houthis are particularly under arms embargo, tighter enforcement of arms transfer will be applied on the Houthis, which will require political will & long-term commitment, consistent with UNSCR 2216.
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18] This means that Yemeni territorial waters will be subject to greater scrutiny, that UNVIM is unlikely to disappear soon, and that war premium insurance for shipping headed to Yemen will hike the prices of goods, including food & medic, where a humanitarian crisis is dire.
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17] Second, the Red Sea & Gulf of Aden will experience further militarization, naval deployments, enhanced patrolling, and surveillance, including through expanding the Combined Task Force 153, established in April 2022, or alternative arrangements integral to the CMF or beyond.
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16] Expanded scope of targets would include American interests in the region, including in the Gulf. There is a heightened risk of multi-directional attacks by Iran’s Resistance Axis targeting US interests in Saudi Arabia & the UAE, as well as countries implicated & within range.
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15] Externally, there are several implications. First, to save their face & demonstrate capability, the Houthis are highly likely to continue maritime attacks undeterred, adopt more complex MOs given their use of mobile missile/drone launchers & expand the scope of their targets
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14] Seventh, the Houthis would exploit this attack to rally public support around the flag by framing the government & its different wings as “pro-Israel” & “pro-American” to escalate internally, likely in Hodeida, Taiz, Marib, Shabwa & Dhale’a as soon as the opportunity allows.
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13] Sixth, Yemen, as a result of unceasing Houthi adventurism at Iran’s behest, is likely to experience higher risk profiling, deeper economic and humanitarian crises, absent a multi-dimensional strategy that paves the way to thwart such a repressive transitional rebel regime.
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12] Fifth, given their framing of maritime attacks as a response to the war on Gaza, they would frame US/UK attack to mobilize fighters, giving credence to their anti-Semitic and anti-American slogan for the first time, after recruiting thousands under ‘Tawfan al-Aqsa Brigades’
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เทียบกับบัญชีขนาดเดียวกัน
5 โพสต์จาก 90 วันที่ผ่านมา เทียบกับช่วง 10K–100K ผู้ติดตาม แสดงในวงกว้าง แต่มีผู้ชมตอบสนองน้อย.
ยอดดูมัธยฐาน1 906บัญชีนี้1 070ค่ามัธยฐานของ 10K–100K
การเข้าถึง, %13.09%บัญชีนี้3.77%ค่ามัธยฐานของ 10K–100K
การมีส่วนร่วม, %0.61%บัญชีนี้1.65%ค่ามัธยฐานของ 10K–100K
| ตัวชี้วัด | บัญชีนี้ | ค่ามัธยฐานของ 10K–100K | อัตราส่วน |
|---|---|---|---|
| ยอดดูมัธยฐานต่อโพสต์ | 1 906 | 1 070 | 1.78× |
| การเข้าถึง (ยอดดู ÷ ผู้ติดตาม) | 13.09% | 3.77% | 3.47× |
| อัตราการมีส่วนร่วม | 0.61% | 1.65% | 0.37× |
บัญชีอื่นในช่วงนี้ → เปรียบเทียบกับบัญชีอื่น → ค่าอ้างอิงเหล่านี้คำนวณอย่างไร →
Growth & engagement
How the posts we collected actually performed: views and reaction rate post by post, what the audience did with them, and where the follower count goes.
Views per post
4.3K12 Jan
4.2K
4.3K
4.7K
2K
2K
2.5K
1.8K
966
20.7K17 Jul
8.6K13 Sep
1.9K
1.6K
33014 Sep
Last 14 collected posts, oldest on the left. The scale is logarithmic: one post can outrun the rest a hundred times over.
Engagement rate per post
0.63%12 Jan
0.54%
0.42%
0.69%
0.68%
0.70%
0.71%
1.37%
0.21%
0.14%17 Jul
0.50%13 Sep
1.73%
0.83%
0.61%14 Sep
Reactions — likes, reposts, replies and quotes — divided by views. Median for 10K–100K accounts is 1.65%.
What the audience does
Likes78.0%680 in total
Reposts14.8%129 in total
Replies4.4%38 in total
Bookmarks2.9%25 in total
Share of every reaction we collected for this account. Replies mean argument, reposts mean endorsement, bookmarks mean the post was worth keeping.
The follower curve appears once this account has two daily snapshots — we take one a day, and this one is on its first.
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